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NOTES
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
CLEANUP: AN EXAMINATION OF THE POLICY
CONFLICT
Hazardous waste cleanup is expensive.' Financially sound own-
ers and operators of hazardous waste dump sites may be able to
bear the burden of fulfilling their environmental cleanup duties,
but owners subsisting on the economic margin may find the burden
unbearable. For these owners, the United States Bankruptcy Code2
(Code) may provide an attractive refuge.
Perhaps inspired by the Manville Corporation's bankruptcy fil-
ing when faced with massive potential tort liability to victims of
asbestos exposure,3 attorneys for hazardous waste site owners are
turning to the Code to help their clients avoid the high cost of
toxic cleanups.4 State and federal governments are not anxious to
increase the number of sites for which no responsible owner can be
found,5 however, and are asking the courts to enforce environmen-
tal laws against bankrupt defendants. In deciding these cases, the
1. The cost of cleaning up improperly disposed waste is estimated at $2000 per ton.
Florio, Foreword to BEYOND DUMPING: NEW STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING Toxic CONTAMINA-
TION at viii (B. Piasecki ed. 1984). Final disposal of hazardous wastes could cost an average
of $25.9 million per site. With between 32,000 and 51,000 potentially dangerous sites identi-
fied throughout the country, the total cleanup bill might be as much as $44.2 billion. Of this
total, only about half is expected to be recoverable from site owners and operators. S. EP-
STEIN, L. BROWN, & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 203 (1984).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). The Bankruptcy Code comprises all of title 11 of the
United State Code.
3. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] BANKL. L. REP. (CCH)
69,615 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1984). The bankrupt in this proceeding sought reorganiza-
tion under Chapter 11 of the Code and protection from thousands of toxic tort claimants
demanding compensation for asbestos-related injuries.
4. Moore, Bankruptcy Stays Thwarting Cleanups, Legal Times, May 9, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
5. Florio, supra note 1, at viii.
6. Comment, Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: An Emerging Conflict, 13
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.), Apr. 1983, at 10,099; see, e.g., In re Quanta Resources
Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984); Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733
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courts face a difficult policy conflict which pits the concerns of en-
vironmental protection against the need to protect the bankrupt
and its creditors.7
At least three provisions of the Code offer possible relief to a
hazardous waste site operator facing massive cleanup costs.8 Oper-
ators most frequently have sought protection under the Code's au-
tomatic stay provision, which automatically enjoins most creditors
from enforcing judgments against or otherwise harassing the
debtor.9  The provision applies to all "entities," including
F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, judgment
vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983) (Kovacs 1).
7. Comment, supra note 6, at 10,099.
8. Other Code provisions also may provide shelter to the financially pressed hazardous
waste site operator. See, e.g., 11 U.S.CA. § 727 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) (discharge of
debts by bankruptcy). This provision was at issue recently in Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705
(1985), in which the Court upheld the Code's protections against a state's efforts to enforce
its environmental laws. Because the Supreme Court's decision examined in detail many of
the policy considerations present in the bankruptcy discharge of environmental obligations
in the context of a personal bankruptcy, this Note will not discuss section 727 in detail.
Section 727 provides an example, however, of another Code provision that may offer sanctu-
ary to individual hazardous waste site operators. Other Code provisions offering similar ref-
uge also are not covered in this Note, but the policy considerations present in any conflict
between these Code sections and the environmental laws are similar to the considerations
underlying the policy clashes this Note does examine.
9. 11 U.S.CA § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). This section provides in part:
Section 362. Automatic stay
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or em-
ployment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or pro-
ceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the es-
tate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;. . . .
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . .
does not operate as a stay-. ..
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to en-
force such governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
1985] BANKRUPTCY AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP
governmental units.10 An exception to the automatic stay applies
when a governmental unit seeks to enforce a non-money judgment
obtained under its police or regulatory power."' If an injunction
requiring the expenditure of funds to clean up a hazardous waste
site is the functional equivalent of a money judgment, 2 however,
the automatic stay may thwart government efforts to force owners
to clean up their toxic waste sites.
The Code's abandonment provision's is another means by which
toxic waste site owners may avoid environmental cleanup costs.
This section permits a bankruptcy trustee to abandon burdensome
property or property of no value to the estate. After the property is
severed from the estate, the bankrupt or the bankruptcy trustee
arguably has no obligation to comply with state or federal cleanup
laws. 4
Finally, the Code's provision describing the general powers of
the court 15 permits a bankruptcy court to enjoin the government
from requiring a site owner to clean up hazardous wastes even
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a
judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or pro-
ceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's po-
lice or regulatory power.
10. 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(14) (West Supp. 1985) defines "entity" as a "person, estate, trust,
[or] governmental unit."
11. 11 U.S.CA § 362(b)(5) (1982); see supra note 9.
12. See Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 456.
13. 11 U.S.CA § 554 (West Supp. 1985). Subsection (a) provides that "[a]fter notice and
a hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the
estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." Id. § 554(a).
14. Once severed from the estate by abandonment, ownership of the hazardous waste site
technically would revert to the debtor. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 377, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6333; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5878. The debtor would remain obligated to
comply with applicable environmental laws and, in the case of an individual debtor, the
state may have some recourse against the individual. See infra notes 262-65 and accompa-
nying text. But see Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 710-11 (1985), in which the Court held
that a debtor's future earnings cannot be attached after bankruptcy to apply toward fulfill-
ment of cleanup duties once the obligation has been discharged under 11 U.S.C_. § 727
(West 1979 & Supp. 1985). If the debtor is a corporation with all of its assets under the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, however, bankruptcy would leave the state with noth-
ing against which to enforce environmental obligations except a bare corporate charter.
15. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West Supp. 1985). Subsection (a) provides that "the court may
issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
sions of this title." Id. § 105(a). This provision empowers the bankruptcy courts to grant the
same injunctive relief as courts of equity.
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though an exception to the automatic stay provision applies. 6 The
court could use this power to block government attempts to force a
cleanup when enforcement would create a true hardship for the
bankrupt's creditors. These general equitable powers are designed
to protect the estate from interference and to ensure its orderly
administration.' 7
Courts have not come to identical conclusions in deciding
whether the Code should shield hazardous waste offenders from
environmental laws. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit indicated in In re Kovacs'8 (Kovacs I) that the auto-
matic stay would block government attempts to force hazardous
waste site cleanup upon a bankrupt if the effort would require a
substantial expenditure of funds.19 In Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources,"0 however, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that state envi-
ronmental enforcement actions against a bankrupt estate were en-
titled to an exception from the automatic stay provision because
these actions were valid exercises of the state's police power.2 The
Third Circuit also addressed the issue in In re Quanta Resources
Corp.,22 in which the court thoroughly discussed the conflicting
policies that enter into the analysis.23 Over a vigorous dissent,24 the
court upheld environmental concerns over the policies underlying
the Code.25
In favoring environmental protection over the bankruptcy pro-
tections offered by the Code, the Third Circuit resolved the con-
flict differently than the Sixth Circuit. The Third Circuit's resolu-
tion, however, may go against the grain of recent United States
16. See HR REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6298.
17. See Comment, supra note 6, at 10,102; see also Diner's Club, Inc. v. Bumb, 421 F.2d
396, 398 (9th Cir. 1970).
18. 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded for con-
sideration of mootness, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983).
19. See id. at 456.
20. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
21. Id. at 278.
22. 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984).
23. Id. at 916-22.
24. Id. at 923-27.
25. Id. at 921-23.
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Supreme Court decisions. In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,26 for
example, the Supreme Court settled a direct conflict between the
Code and labor laws in favor of the Code.27 Likewise, the Court
upheld personal bankruptcy protections over state environmental
law enforcement actions in Ohio v. Kovacs.2 s Although these deci-
sions may portend the extension of full bankruptcy protections to
hazardous waste operators who file under the Code, the Supreme
Court refused to state that the Third Circuit had decided Penn
Terra incorrectly, and emphasized that its decision was not meant
to undermine the enforcement of environmental laws.29 These
cases reflect the difficulty the courts have encountered in attempt-
ing to find a uniform resolution to the policy conflict.
This Note analyzes the policies underlying the United States
Bankruptcy Code and compares them with the policies promoted
by environmental protection statutes. The Note also discusses re-
cent cases in which courts have addressed the policy conflicts and
the statutory framework in which these conflicts arise. The Note
concludes that, without a change in either the law or the courts'
statutory interpretation, hazardous waste site owners will continue
to receive significant protection in bankruptcy from most govern-
ment efforts to require environmental cleanup. Any other result
under existing law would constitute an inordinate infringement
upon the rights of a bankrupt's creditors. Courts possess sufficient
discretion under the Code to control flagrant abuse of its protec-
tions, but varying interpretations of this discretion may produce
inconsistent results. Finally, the Note proposes several solutions to
this dilemma, and concludes that the ultimate solution is congres-
sional action to clarify the rights of all parties potentially affected
by the bankruptcy of a hazardous waste operator.
26. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
27. Id. at 1199 (upholding a debtor's rejection of a collective bargaining agreement).
28. 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985); see supra note 8.
29. See id. at 711-12 & n.11. See also the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, in
which she emphasized that "the Court's holding... cannot be viewed as hostile to state
enforcement of environmental laws." Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ESTABLISHING A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Purpose of the Bankruptcy Code
The purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is "to convert the assets of
the bankrupt into cash for distribution among creditors and then
to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebt-
edness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."30 The
Code must serve the needs of both the private entities involved in
the bankruptcy action and the public as a whole,3 because the
needs of commerce mandate an efficient and fair resolution of busi-
ness insolvencies.
The fundamental purpose of the Code is to conserve the debtor's
estate for the benefit of his creditors.32 Bankruptcy laws cannot
disregard the property rights of a bankrupt's creditors; they must
consider the interests of those who have dealt in good faith with
the bankrupt.3 3 Although Congress' bankruptcy power, like its
commerce power, is plenary,3 4 constitutional limitations, including
the fifth amendment prohibition of "takings," still apply.3 5 Distri-
bution of a debtor's property may discharge some debts and impair
preexisting obligations, but such actions must be accomplished
fairly and equitably to avoid conflict with constitutional
protections.3 6
In a liquidation proceeding, 37 a bankruptcy court focuses on
creditors' rights because the goal of liquidation is the equitable
distribution of assets. In a reorganization proceeding,38 however,
the goal of providing deserving debtors a fresh start also must be
30. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915).
31. Personal Fin. Co. v. Day, 126 F.2d 281, 282 (10th Cir. 1942).
32. See In re McGoldrick, 121 F.2d 746, 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 675 (1941).
33. Bank of Matin v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 192 (10th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds,
385 U.S. 99 (1966).
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
35. In re American States Pub. Serv. Co., 12 F. Supp. 667, 690 (D. Md. 1935), modified on
other grounds sub nom. Burco, Inc. v. Whitworth, 81 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 297
U.S. 724 (1936).
36. Ginsberg v. Lindel, 107 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1939).
37. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 covers liquidation in Chapter 7. See Pub. L. No.
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.CA. §§ 701-766 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985)).
38. See Chapter 11, id. (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985)).
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considered.39 Recognizing that the economic worth of the debtor's
business as a going concern may exceed the liquidation value of its
assets, reorganization permits a distressed business to continue op-
erating, thereby providing jobs, products, and tax revenues. 40 The
Code, therefore, not only requires that creditors receive their share
of the estate as quickly and inexpensively as possible,41 but also
shelters a financially distressed business from unilateral actions
that may disrupt orderly administration of the estate and fair dis-
tribution of its assets. 42 Efficient administration gives the bankrupt
the greatest chance of successful rehabilitation.
Although the Code serves many legitimate purposes, businesses
occasionally attempt to exploit its protections. Courts have refused
to allow use of bankruptcy solely to hinder, delay, or defraud credi-
tors43 because these uses would frustrate the Code's goals of pro-
viding fair treatment to creditors and a fresh start to deserving
businesses. Because the bankruptcy courts act essentially as courts
of equity, an improper request for bankruptcy protection should
result in denial of equitable relief.
Once a business properly claims bankruptcy protections, state
laws may not frustrate the Code's federally granted relief.45 The
supremacy clause 46 mandates suspension of state laws that conflict
with the Code, but general rules of statutory construction dictate
that the suspension apply only to the extent of the conflict.47 A
court must examine the statutory scheme as a whole to determine
if a conflict exists.48 If the statutory scheme as a whole does not
39. Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1966).
40. Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of Environmental Regulation: Harvest of Commercial Tim-
ber as an Introduction to a Clash of Policies, 12 ENvL. L. 1, 1-2 (1981).
41. Huston v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (W.D. Pa. 1951).
42. Aaron, supra note 40, at 3.
43. Hill v. Topeka Morris Plan Co., 105 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
595 (1939).
44. In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 592 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1979).
45. In re Bonant, 1 Bankr. 335, 338 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979).
46. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). For a
supremacy clause decision in a bankruptcy setting, see Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-
One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 126 (1937).
47. In re Wittstein, 166 F. Supp. 122, 123 (D.V.I. 1958); see also Stellwagen v. Clum, 245
U.S. 605, 613 (1918).
48. Grimes v. Hoschler, 12 Cal. 3d 305, 310, 525 P.2d 65, 67-68, 115 Cal. Rptr. 625, 627-28
(1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).
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conflict directly with the Code, courts generally will not find a con-
flict between specific sections because preemption is disfavored un-
less that conclusion is unmistakable.49
When the conflict arises between the Code and other federal
statutes, the proper approach to resolution of the conflict is not as
clear. In general, courts try to construe apparently conflicting stat-
utes so that both provisions will stand,50 avoiding a construction
that might impair the operation of other laws Congress probably
did not intend to repeal."' To best carry out the will of Congress,
the courts examine the statutory schemes and their underlying pol-
icies as a whole.52 When a bankruptcy law arguably conflicts with
another statute, however, the courts will give effect to a more spe-
cific provision over a more general one,53 and then to the more re-
cent statute if the conflict is otherwise irreconcilable.54 Most im-
portantly, in any conflict resolution courts must interpret the
statutes in light of the original purpose that prompted Congress to
legislate.5
Environmental Protection and Hazardous Waste Cleanup Laws
For several decades, "Americans have put their lead, mercury,
chlorinated hydrocarbons, PCB's, benzene, cyanides, and other as-
sorted poisons into the ground."56 Most of these poisons have been
dumped "into landfills, abandoned wells, holding ponds, open
fields, and even old titan missile silos. '5 7 The quantity of waste is
staggering: eighty billion pounds of toxic wastes are dumped annu-
ally in the United States, and the volume is growing steadily. 58
49. See Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
50. United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1877).
51. Mills v. Scott, 99 U.S. 25, 28 (1878); see also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266-67
(1981).
52. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
53. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980).
54. Although disfavored, implied repeal will be found if the conflict is sufficiently direct.
See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1936).
55. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979); see also In re
Law, 37 Bankr. 501, 511 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984) (courts must give effect to legislative
intent).
56. Piasecki, Beyond Dumping: An Overview and Introduction, in BEYOND DUMPING: NEW
STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING Toxic CONTAMINATION XiV (B. Piasecki ed. 1984).
57. Id.
58. Gore, Foreword to S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN, & C. POPE, supra note 1, at ix.
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Only recently has this country recognized that such disposal "poses
unacceptable long-term risks to public health and the environ-
ment. '59 Hazards presented by these wastes include groundwater
and water supply contamination, well closures, destruction of in-
digenous plant and animal habitats, human health problems such
as kidney and respiratory diseases, soil contamination, fish kills,
livestock injuries, damage to sewage treatment facilities, air pollu-
tion, and fires.60
The public outcry over these toxic waste hazards61 has spurred
government action. The states, exercising their broad police pow-
ers,6 2 enacted the first statutes dealing with toxic wastes. These
statutes require comprehensive plans for the tracking of hazardous
waste to insure proper disposal.6 3 The vast'scope of the toxic waste
problem also has compelled the federal government to act. Con-
gress has used its commerce power to enact legislation designed to
cope with severe hazardous waste pollution through emergency
cleanup powers, regulatory requirements, guidelines for state gov-
ernments, and cost recoupment provisions.6 4 In addition, federal
and state courts have used such common law theories as nuisance
and trespass to permit recovery for toxic waste injuries and to
force private abatement of these hazards. 5
59. Davis, Discouraging Dumping: The California Example, in BEYOND DUMPING: NEW
STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING Toxic CONTANINATION 71 (B. Piasecki ed. 1984).
60. S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN, & C. POPE, supra note 1, at 27.
61. Id. at 38.
62. The states' police powers encompass toxic waste hazards because environmental poi-
sons pose a serious threat to the public health, safety, and welfare.
63. In 1972, California became the first state to require "cradle-to-grave" hazardous waste
tracking. Davis, supra note 59, at 74. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25100-25249
(West 1984). Other comprehensive state statutes include: Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous
Material Release Prevention and Response Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, §§ 1-13
(West Supp. 1984-85); Industrial Waste Management Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONsERv. LAW §§ 27-
0900 to -0923 (McKinney 1984); Virginia Hazardous Waste Facilities Siting Act, VA. CODE
§§ 10-186.1 to .21 (Supp. 1984).
64. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.CA §§ 6901-6987 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985));
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42, & 49 U.S.C.).
See generally J. QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION OF HAzARDOUS WASTES: A GuIDE TO RCRA
(1982).
65. See, e.g., State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 468 A.2d 150
(1983) (corporation strictly liable for abatement of nuisance caused by hazardous wastes and
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Each of the above-mentioned legislative or judicial actions places
liability on the party responsible for creating the hazard. This fea-
ture reflects the notion that wrongdoers should be held responsible
for their wrongs and should mitigate the effects of their wrongdo-
ings whether the injured parties are individuals or the general pub-
lic. Requiring the responsible party to remove any resulting
hazards also prevents future wrongs by eliminating a potential
source of injuries that might not become manifest until years
later,66 when the wrongdoer or an estate may no longer exist to
provide a recovery. The concerted statutory and judicial effort to
control toxic wastes evidences a strong public policy aimed at the
elimination of toxic waste problems. Those who disregard the
hazards posed by indiscriminate toxic waste dumping should not
easily avoid their responsibility for repairing the environmental
harm they have caused.6 7
The Problem
When hazardous waste site owners use the Code to shield them-
selves from state-imposed environmental cleanup duties, they cre-
ate a policy dilemma for the courts. On the one hand, strong poli-
cies favor preserving the bankruptcy estate for the bankrupt's
creditors and, to some extent, for the debtor. On the other hand,
strong policies favor protecting the public health and the environ-
ment from hazardous wastes. Federal and state governments have
for trespass due to escape of some wastes onto adjoining land). Compare City of Philadel-
phia v. Stephan Chemical Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135 (1982), in which the court held that federal
environmental statutes had preempted any federal common law of nuisance but permitted a
claim for recovery based upon the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980. The court refused to dismiss state common law nuisance and
trespass claims, however, ruling that sufficient questions of fact were raised by the pleadings
to permit their consideration on the merits.
66. See generally Moore, Barrage of Private Tort Claims Simmers Beneath Toxic
Dumps, Legal Times, Oct. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 2 (discussing enormous potential for tort
claims related to hazardous waste disposal sites).
67. The Virginia General Assembly clearly expressed its intent that "costs of long-term
post-closure care and maintenance of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facili-
ties should be borne by their owners and operators." VA. CODE § 10-186.2 (Supp. 1984).
Representative George Miller of California, commenting on the Manville Corporation's
bankruptcy filing, said, "No company should be able to cloak itself in the judicial processes
of the U.S. to evade all responsibility." Rotbart, Manville Corp. Faces Increasing Opposi-
tion to Bankruptcy Filing, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1984, at 1, col. 6, 20, col. 1.
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enacted statutes furthering both policies, but these statutes do not
resolve effectively the conflict that arises when these policies clash.
Congress, in particular, failed to foresee the potential intersection
of these policies, 6 thus forcing the courts to weigh the competing
concerns and to solve the conflict on an ad hoc basis.
To solve this conflict, the courts should heed Chief Justice Mar-
shall's observation that "[w]here the mind labours to discover the
design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid may
be derived."69 Although extensive legislative histories exist for both
the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act and the federal environmental
laws, 70 Congress did not consider how certain provisions of the
Code might apply in the environmental cleanup arena.7 1 To deter-
mine what Congress might have intended had it foreseen this con-
flict, proper analysis requires an examination of the purposes and
policies underlying applicable provisions of the bankruptcy and en-
vironmental laws.
Federal environmental laws do not apply until a site presents an
imminent and substantial threat to the public health or safety,72
while state environmental laws generally require a cleanup before
the site presents an imminent threat. Statutory conflicts, therefore,
usually arise between the Code and state environmental laws. As a
result, courts must consider not only the policy conflict between
bankruptcy and environmental laws generally, but also the conflict
68. Aaron, supra note 40, at 2.
69. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805).
70. For the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (1978), see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5787; 124 CONG. REc. 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards of California in
lieu of a conference report); 124 CONG. REc. 33,992 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini in
lieu of a conference report). For the legislative history of one of the major environmental
cleanup laws, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26, 42, & 49 U.S.C.), see H.R. REP. No. 1016, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6119; H.R. Ran. No. 1016, Part II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6151.
71. See, e.g., Quanta, 739 F.2d at 916 (no legislative history of 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)). But
see H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 343 (1977) (11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) exempts injunc-
tions for environmental protection from the automatic stay).
72. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1108-10 (D.
Minn. 1982); United States v. Price, 532 F. Supp. 1055, 1070 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d
204 (3d Cir. 1982).
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between the federal origin of the Code and the state origin of most
applicable environmental laws.
CASES EXAMINING STATUTORY CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
In re Kovacs
The Opinion
Kovacs operated a hazardous waste site in Ohio, and a state
court ordered him to clean up all industrial wastes on his prop-
erty.73 When Kovacs failed to meet his required cleanup schedule,
the court appointed a receiver to perform the work. Kovacs filed
for personal bankruptcy and asserted the automatic stay against
the State's attempt to apply part of his current income against the
receiver's cleanup costs.7 4 The State claimed that it was exempt
from the automatic stay due to the exception contained in Code
section 362(b)(5) for actions taken pursuant to the police power of
the state.75 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed both the bankruptcy and the district courts' grant of
an automatic stay. The court of appeals held that, although section
362 permitted state courts to enforce police power statutes through
mandatory injunctions despite bankruptcy filings, it forbade states
from collecting money from the estates through their enforcement
efforts. The court concluded that the State's attempt to seek con-
tribution from Kovacs for the cleanup was essentially an attempt
to enforce a money judgment. The automatic stay applied.76
In reaching this decision, the court based its interpretation of
section 362 on the joint comments of the chairmen of the Senate
and House committees that drafted the 1978 Bankruptcy Act.77
73. Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 453.
74. Id. at 455.
75. Id. at 455-56.
76. Id. at 456.
77. Id. The Sixth Circuit relied on a passage in In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp.
1333, 1340 (D.P.R. 1979) to support the need for a narrow construction of the exceptions in
section 362(b), allowing enforcement of a state's police power in spite of the automatic stay.
In Canarico, the Court quoted a statement by Judge Herzog that also was repeated verba-
tim in statements by the chairmen of the House and Senate committees that drafted the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978. See infra note 87. Due to its passage near the end of a session of
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The committee chairmen noted that Congress intended a narrow
construction of the automatic stay exceptions, to permit govern-
mental units to pursue actions protecting the public health and
safety, but not to permit governmental units to protect their pecu-
niary interests in the property of a debtor or debtor's estate.7 8
With this in mind, the court of appeals held that to permit the
State to enforce an injunction that was essentially a money judg-
ment "would subvert the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to reha-
bilitate debtors and give them relief from harassing creditors. 7 9
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court va-
cated and remanded Kovacs I for consideration of mootness s0 The
Sixth Circuit, however, reaffirmed the rationale of Kovacs I in Ko-
vacs 11,81 which involved a related appeal concerning the discharge
through bankruptcy of Kovacs' obligation to the State to perform
cleanup."2 The court of appeals determined that the State could
not use "linguistic gymnastics"8 3 to disguise a money judgment as
an injunction requiring the payment of money. Because Kovacs
personally could not perform the cleanup, he could comply with
the state court's injunction only through cash expenditures.
Congress, the Act never went to a conference committee. Instead, the two committees recon-
ciled differing provisions in the two bills without a conference and issued joint statements
by the committee chairmen in lieu of a conference report. See 124 CONG. REc. 32,395 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Edwards of California); 124 CONG. REC. 33,995 (1978) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
78. 124 CONG. REc. 32,395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards of California); 124 CoNG.
REc. 33,995 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
79. 681 F.2d at 456.
80. Ohio v. Kovacs, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983), granting cert., vacating judgment, and remand-
ing for consideration of mootness In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982). The Court
suspected mootness because, while the appeal was pending, the district court had declared
Kovacs' obligation discharged under 11 U.S.CA § 727 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). The case
involved a personal bankruptcy, so the automatic stay no longer was essential to protect
Kovacs from the State's enforcement efforts.
81. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct.
705 (1985) (Kovacs II).
82. 717 F.2d at 988. Many hazardous waste sites are owned by "mom and pop" operations
rather than corporations. Moore, supra note 4, at 9, col. 1. Because the Supreme Court
found for the bankrupt in Ohio v. Kovacs, discharge of cleanup obligations in personal
bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.A § 727 may provide an attractive refuge for small, individual
waste site owners who hope to escape their environmental duties. See supra note 8.
83. 717 F.2d at 988.
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Analysis of Kovacs I and Kovacs II
Many injunctions may require some expenditure of funds, yet
are not considered money judgments. If an injunction requires ex-
penditures by an individual for the performance of functions
uniquely within the capability of that individual, the injunction re-
tains its equitable character.8 4 In Kovacs I, however, the injunction
ordering cleanup required Kovacs to spend money for a function
not uniquely within his capability. The same funds paid to any
contractor capable of doing the work could have accomplished the
cleanup. The court properly characterized the State's injunction as
the equivalent of a money judgment. Apparently, the State wanted
Kovacs to pay the cleanup bill so the State could avoid the ex-
pense. If so, the State was attempting to protect a pecuniary inter-
est, not the public interest, and was attempting to place itself
ahead of the other unsecured creditors rather than obtaining a
money judgment in its traditional form and waiting with other un-
secured creditors to collect from the estate.
Although the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the automatic stay pro-
vision in Kovacs I generally was sound, the court may not have
gone far enough in considering the strong public policy behind cur-
rent environmental cleanup efforts. The Kovacs site obviously was
a substantial threat to the environment because it attracted the
attention of state agencies and moved them to action. Although
the threat to public health was not sufficiently imminent and sub-
stantial to attract direct federal involvement, public health con-
cerns certainly prompted the State to exercise its police power to
correct the problem.
Had it directly considered the tension between state and federal
power presented by Ohio's attempt to force a cleanup of Kovacs'
site, the Sixth Circuit reasonably could have determined that, by
84. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977); see also United States v. Price,
688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) (that an injunction requires expenditures of money does not
foreclose equitable relief); cf. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 61-62 (1975)
(injunctive relief is designed to operate prospectively and prevent future activity, not to
punish past conduct); Martinez v. Winner, 548 F. Supp. 278, 310 (D. Colo. 1982) (a real and
imminent danger must exist, not just a fear that injury will occur, to justify injunctive re-
lief); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744, 749 (D. Mass. 1967),
afl'd, 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968) (mandatory injunctions are
not issued in doubtful cases or when injury can be compensated adequately by damages).
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applying section 362 to all entities, Congress effected a partial
withdrawal of state police power.8 5 The Code's legislative history
states that Congress intended through section 362 to assert federal
bankruptcy power over state governments. 6 Despite the limited
exceptions to the automatic stay it provided in section 362(b),87
Congress did intend the automatic stay provision to limit the abil-
ity of state governments to exert their police powers over bank-
rupts and their estates. Because the State did not assert, clearly
and primarily, a health or safety concern in Kovacs I, the Sixth
Circuit reasonably determined that the automatic stay held in
abeyance any attempt to exercise the State's police power to
recoup cleanup costs from Kovacs or his estate.
In Kovacs I and II, the Sixth Circuit only cursorily analyzed the
meaning of "money judgment" in section 362(b)(5). The court's
conclusion concerning this issue, however, was similar to the con-
clusion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Jaffee v. United States:"8 "A plaintiff cannot transform a claim
for damages into an equitable action by asking for an injunction
that orders the payment of money."8'9 More recently, the Third
Circuit announced a helpful distinction: "Damages are awarded as
a form of substitutional redress. They are intended to compensate
a party for an injury suffered or other loss.' '9° By contrast, equita-
ble relief usually prevents further conduct."' In more thoroughly
85. When the police power of the state is "deemed withdrawn by Congress in bankruptcy
legislation, evidence of that withdrawal in fit language should be found within the act." In
re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942).
86. Specifically, the legislative history states: "With respect to stays issued... to govern-
mental actions, [section 362] and the other sections mentioned are intended to be an ex-
press waiver of sovereign immunity of the Federal Government, and an assertion of the
bankruptcy power over State governments under the supremacy clause notwithstanding a
State's sovereign immunity." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 342, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6299; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, at 51, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5837.
87. "Section 362(b)(4) . . . is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to per-
mit governmental units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to
apply to actions by a governmental unit to protect a pecuniary interest in property of the
debtor or property of the estate." 124 CONG. REc. 32,395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards
of California); 124 CoNG. REc. 33,995 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
88. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1979).
89. Id. at 715.
90. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982).
91. Id.
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analyzing whether the State actually was seeking a money judg-
ment, the court in Kovacs I might have asked whether the State's
main intent was to correct a past wrong to the environment or to
prevent a future harm to the public health.
In a similar case, United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,9 2
the United States District Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire found that the unwillingness of the involved state and federal
governments to bear the financial burden of cleaning up a long-
existing dump site caused the injunctive action to resemble a re-
quest for a money judgment. The court held that the request for
the injunction was subject to the automatic stay.9 3 The situation
was analogous to Kovacs I, in which the State did not find that the
prevention of future harmful effects merited its own expenditures
to clean up the site, yet sought recovery from the bankrupt to pay
for the cleanup 4 The Johns-Manville decision supports the Sixth
Circuit's determination that a state is subject to the automatic stay
when it in essence seeks to impose a money judgment against the
bankrupt estate.9
5
Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources
The Opinion
Penn Terra operated coal mines which did not conform to state
environmental requirements. A Pennsylvania state court ordered
Penn Terra to comply with state regulations by backfilling and re-
claiming the mine sites to control erosion and sedimentation.
Shortly thereafter, Penn Terra filed for liquidation under Chapter
7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The State nevertheless continued to
pursue cleanup efforts and obtained an injunction ordering Penn
92. 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INsT.) 20,310 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 1982).
93. Id. at 20,312.
94. 681 F.2d at 454-55.
95. In Kovacs I, the State stressed the need to force remedial cleanup of Kovacs' waste
site, rather than abate any perceived prospective threat to the public health or safety. Had
the State emphasized the prospective effects of the desired cleanup, the Sixth Circuit might
have been more receptive to the State's plea for mandatory injunctive relief. See supra
notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
96. Penn Terra, Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 269 & n.2 (3d Cir.
1984).
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Terra to perform site reclamation.9 7 The bankruptcy court granted
Penn Terra's request to stay this order under section 362, holding
that the injunction was an attempt to enforce a money judgment
and thus was not excepted from the automatic stay. 8 The district
court affirmed, noting that the purpose of the state injunction was
not only to enforce the environmental regulation but also to ex-
haust the debtor's assets ahead of the other creditors. 9 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that the State could correct Penn Terra's environmental
violations through the exercise of its police power. Because the
court determined that the injunction ordering compliance with the
state regulation was not a money judgment within the meaning of
the Code, the court excepted it from the automatic stay.100
Analysis of Penn Terra
In Penn Terra, the Third Circuit recognized that Congress in-
tended to subject allt entities to the automatic stay.101 The court
noted, however, that when the state exercises its traditional police
power through environmental regulation, a court should not infer
preemption by the Code without clear indication of this congres-
sional intent."0 " The court concluded that, to avoid interference
with state police power, exceptions to the automatic stay should be
construed broadly, and that the term "money judgment" should be
construed narrowly. 10 3
The Third Circuit's broad interpretation of the automatic stay
exceptions ignores congressional guidance that the exceptions were
to be construed narrowly. 04 Although the court acknowledged
Congress' guidance in a footnote, it posited that the congressional
position did no more than state the problem before the court.10 5 In
97. Id. at 270.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 278-79.
101. Id. at 271.
102. Id. at 272-73.
103. Id. at 273.
104. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
105. 733 F.2d at 274 n.6.
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reaching this conclusion, the court defined away a legislative his-
tory requiring a construction opposite to that desired by the court.
The Third Circuit failed to give proper effect to Congress' intent
regarding the application of the automatic stay.106
In addition to its broad and arguably inappropriate construction
of the automatic stay exceptions, the court of appeals failed to ex-
amine the motives underlying the State's attempt to enforce its
environmental regulations in the particular case. In considering the
state court's order to Penn Terra, the court of appeals observed
that environmental protection falls squarely within the State's po-
lice power, 110 but the court did not analyze whether the State actu-
ally acted against Penn Terra to promote the public health, safety,
and welfare so that the State warranted an exception from the au-
tomatic stay in this case. Because compliance with the environ-
mental regulations primarily required backfilling, site dressing, and
seeding to control erosion and sedimentation,os the threat to pub-
lic health or safety was not as severe as the threat presented by
toxic waste sites. Although corrective measures would have pre-
vented any slight threat to safety caused by rough landscape, this
result alone was hardly a compelling justification for this use of the
police power within the narrow exceptions to the automatic stay,
particularly when large expenditures would have been required to
perform the ordered work.
The Penn Terra opinion did devote considerable attention to
whether the State was attempting to enforce a money judgment by
its injunction. 10 9 The court noted that a money judgment usually
requires the payment of a specific amount of damages to a party
and does not provide for its own enforcement. 10 Applying this
fairly technical definition, the court concluded that an action for
injunctive relief that does not seek a specific sum and provide for
106. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274 (1974) (legislative history is im-
portant in construing a statute). But cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26
(1977) (reliance on legislative history in divining congressional intent is a step to be taken
cautiously); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 61 (1949) (legislative history need not be referred
to in construing a statute when statutory language is clear).
107. 733 F.2d at 274.
108. Id. at 270 n.3, 278.
109. Id. at 274-78.
110. Id. at 275.
[Vol. 27:165
BANKRUPTCY AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP
its own enforcement does not constitute a money judgment. This
interpretation of "money judgment" ignored the Third Circuit's
own observation that when a term is not defined in a statute,
"Congress means to incorporate the established meaning" of the
term."' The more common understanding of "money judgment" is
a judgment for monetary, as opposed to equitable, relief." 2 Con-
gress apparently meant "money judgment" to refer to legal actions
in general, thus excepting only true equitable actions from the au-
tomatic stay. Equitable actions are by their very nature those for
which money damages will not provide adequate relief. The court
in Penn Terra should have asked whether the State's claim satis-
fied the equitable requirement that money damages would not pro-
vide adequate relief,"' not whether the State's injunction met a
fairly technical definition of "money judgment."
In its analysis of whether monetary damages could provide ade-
quate relief, the Third Circuit also should have relied on its own
holding in Jaffee v. United States."4 In Jaffee, the court of ap-
peals held that artful pleading could not transform a claim for
damages into a claim for equitable relief.1 5 In Jaffee, the plaintiff
asked the court to order the government to provide medical treat-
ment for the plaintiff's injuries."' The court found that the plain-
tiff's claim was more akin to a traditional request for damages in
tort, and not an action suitable for equitable relief." 7 Although the
payments were sought to cover future medical treatment, they
were based on past injuries. Traditional damages awards compen-
sate the plaintiff, in part, for the future economic injury of medical
111. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Amex Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)).
112. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 907 (5th ed. 1979).
113. Legal relief may be "inadequate" when a defendant is judgment-proof, as is the case
with a bankrupt. Inadequacy usually is judged in relation to the form of relief itself, how-
ever, not with regard to the collectibility of a judgment against a particular defendant. Nev-
ertheless, some courts have taken this factor into consideration in evaluating the adequacy
of a plaintiff's remedy at law. 42 Am. JuR. 2D Injunctions § 53 (1969). When injunctive relief
has been granted due to the defendant's insolvency, the cases have involved injunctions
prohibiting wrongful acts such as the payment of money to a third party or the transfer of
property, and not the performance of affirmative obligations requiring expenditure of funds
that the defendant does not have. See 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 30(b) (1978).
114. 592 F.2d 712 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1979).
115. Id. at 715.
116. Id. at 714.
117. Id. at 715.
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expenses generated by past physical injuries,"" as determined us-
ing liquidated estimates of these costs.1 19
The Third Circuit adopted the view in Penn Terra that damages
could not be liquidated because Penn Terra's damage to the envi-
ronment posed the threat of future harm.120 This view ignored the
fact that any competent earthwork contractor could have reduced
the required reclamation work to a sum certain simply by submit-
ting a cost estimate.' 2' Although a cost estimate could not account
fully for any future harms the site might cause, the only future
damages identified in Penn Terra were the potential for further
erosion and a possible safety hazard. 22 The court's analysis was
tantamount to saying that tort damages for physical injury could
not be liquidated because medical complications might occur if the
patient did not get treatment. Remedial actions to correct past en-
vironmental damage at the Penn Terra site would have prevented
any future harm. The State sought relief to correct past damages
at the site with only a secondary concern for any future harm that
might occur if the remedial actions were not performed. A compe-
tent contractor could have liquidated the State's claim to a mone-
tary amount in this case by estimating the cost of the required re-
medial work. Because equitable relief should be available only
when money damages are insufficient and because the State could
show no direct threat to public health or safety, the State essen-
tially enforced a money judgment through artful pleading, contrary
to Jaffee.
In re Quanta Resources Corp.
The Opinion
Quanta Resources Corporation operated a hazardous waste site
in New York. After a brief period of operation in reorganization
118. Id.
119. See 25 C.J.S. Damages § 91(3), at 984 (1966).
120. 733 F.2d at 277.
121. The required work consisted of backfilling and grading, submission of erosion and
sedimentation control plans, sealing a mine opening, submission of a plan for removal of
stockpiled topsoil, effectuation of plans to remove the topsoil stockpile and to control ero-
sion and sedimentation, and completing topsoil spreading, mulching, and seeding. Id. at 270
n.3.
122. Id. at 278.
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under Chapter 11, the corporation filed for liquidation under
Chapter 7 of the Code.123 The trustee of the bankrupt's estate
sought to abandon corporate land that was filled with waste oil
storage tanks, including some contaminated with PCB's. 124 The
trustee brought the abandonment action under section 554 of the
Code, which permits abandonment of burdensome estate prop-
erty.125 The bankruptcy court and the district court agreed that
the abandonment was permissible within the plain meaning of the
language in section 554.128
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed. Consistent with its Penn Terra analysis, the Third Circuit
maintained that a balance had to be struck between the competing
public interests of protection of a bankrupt's creditors through
abandonment of burdensome property and protection of the envi-
ronment. 127 Despite the express language of section 554, the court
found that Congress did not intend to supercede state environmen-
tal laws through this Code provision. Noting that another section
of the United States Code requires the trustee to operate a bank-
rupt's estate in compliance with state law,12s the court determined
that Congress did not intend the abandonment provision to "sub-
jugate state and local regulatory laws."'129 The court thus con-
cluded that section 554 did not permit the bankruptcy trustee to
abandon Quanta Corporation's hazardous waste site.130 Finding no
irreconcilable conflict between the Code and state environmental
law, the court held that the Code did not preempt the state law in
this instance.''
123. Quanta, 739 F.2d at 913.
124. Id. PCB's, polychlorinated biphenyls, are extremely hazardous chemicals. See gener-
ally MCGRAw-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 577-78 (2d ed. 1980) (describ-
ing hazards of PCB's).
125. 11 U.S.C.A. § 554 (West Supp. 1985); see supra note 13.
126. 739 F.2d at 914.
127. Id. at 921-22.
128. 28 U.S.CA § 959(b) (West Supp. 1985) states that a trustee should manage the
property of the estate "according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State in which
such property is situated." Although this provision expressly applies only to estates in reor-
ganization as opposed to liquidation, the court held that this provision indicated Congress'
intent regarding the scope of a trustee's powers. 739 F.2d at 919.
129. 739 F.2d at 919.
130. Id. at 921-22.
131. Id. at 922.
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Analysis of Quanta
New York opposed abandonment of the waste site on two
grounds: general considerations of public policy, as reflected in the
state environmental laws; and congressional intent to limit a trus-
tee's power to disregard local law, as reflected in the language of 28
U.S.C. § 959.132 In evaluating the State's assertions, the Third Cir-
cuit cogently analyzed the competing policy considerations. The
court addressed federal preemption of state statutes, asking
whether Congress intended to permit a trustee to exercise the
abandonment power free of state health and safety regulations.13 3
The court refused to find such an intent absent some explicit con-
gressional expression of total federal preemption.3
The dissent in Quanta criticized the majority's analysis of the
federal preemption issue because the majority relied on cases de-
cided under the old bankruptcy law.135 That law did not provide
explicitly for abandonment of burdensome property; the courts
had developed abandonment as a judicial doctrine. 136 Under this
doctrine, the courts would decide whether to permit abandonment
for the protection of creditors by distinguishing state regulations
on the basis of their relative importance to the public. 137 The dis-
sent argued that the majority relied incorrectly on the earlier cases.
The doctrine of abandonment had been replaced by a specific stat-
utory provision and, unlike some provisions of the Code, the aban-
donment provision contained no exceptions. 138
132. Id. at 914.
133. Id. at 915.
134. Id. at 918.
135. Id. at 923-24 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see also Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d
289 (4th Cir.), af'g In re Eastern Transp. Co., 102 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1952) (trustee could
not abandon four barges in a harbor when abandonment would violate navigation safety
laws, even though the cost of compliance with the laws would exceed the value of the
barges); In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 1 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1974) (trus-
tee could not abandon underground steam pipes, vents, and manholes when doing so would
create health and safety hazards). But see In re Adelphi Hospital Corp., BANK. L. REP.
(CCH) 66,882, at 76,856 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (abandonment of hospital records
allowed despite state law requiring insolvent hospitals to store them).
136. 739 F.2d at 923-24 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 918.
138. Id. at 924 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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The limited legislative history of section 554 does not reveal
whether Congress intended exceptions to the abandonment author-
ization. 139 Under the applicable rule of statutory construction,
however, legislation which does not alter common law expressly is
interpreted as encompassing common law within its plain mean-
ing. 140 This rule supports the majority's reliance upon the reason-
ing of the earlier cases decided under the common law doctrine of
abandonment.
The plain language of section 554 strongly suggests that Con-
gress did not contemplate giving the trustee an absolute right to
abandon property. The trustee may abandon estate property only
after a hearing.141 This hearing requirement serves little purpose if
the trustee need not obtain the court's permission to abandon
property. The hearing requirement permits the court to determine
whether the proposed abandonment complies with state law, and
to weigh the impact upon creditors if the estate cannot abandon
the property. The hearing requirement also embodies the principle
that bankruptcy courts are courts of equity; they must balance the
competing concerns that influence rulings concerning the estate. 42
Although courts continue to differ in their interpretations of the
abandonment provisions, the interpretation that requires judicial
139. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 6333; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, At 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 5878; 124 CONG. REC. 32,401 (1978) (statement by Rep. Edwards of California);
124 CONG. REc: 34,000 (1978) (statement by Sen. DeConcini); cf. Quanta, 739 F.2d at 916
(stating thAt no legislative history existed for section 554). Perhaps the court meant that it
found no helpful legislative history for section 554.
140. Section 554 seeks to clarify the law of abandonment and to codify the case law that
resulted from legislative silence on the matter, not to make any significant change in the
abandonment law. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRup'cy (MB) 554.01 (15th ed. 1985). Decisions
under the old Bankruptcy Act were intended to fill the gaps left in the 1978 Code's treat-
ment of abandonment in section 554. BANKS. SERv. (L. ED.) § 23:111 (1979); see St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, 583 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (N.D. Ala. 1984); see also Tarlton v.
Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (absent the clearest statement of congressional
policies, a court will not impute a legislative intent to contravene settled common law
principles).
141. See 11 U.S.CA § 554(a) (West Supp. 1985); supra note 13.
142. See In re Stark, 26 Bankr. 178, 180 (C.D. Ill. 1982); In re Supreme Plastics, Inc., 8
Bankr. 730, 735 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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approval of abandonment has emerged as the preferred rule and
the better practice. 143
Assuming that the abandonment provision vests the courts with
discretion to deny abandonment on public health or safety
grounds, a denial may create a further problem. The majority and
dissent in Quanta both noted that forced retention of burdensome
property and imposition of environmental cleanup duties on the
trustee would harm creditors. According to the dissent, this harm
could reach constitutional proportions and constitute a "taking"
under the fifth amendment.14 If cleanup costs for the hazardous
waste site consumed the entire estate, that point certainly would
be valid.145
Whether the cleanup costs would consume a disproportionate
amount of an estate would depend on how the court charged
cleanup costs to the estate after refusing to permit abandonment.
For example, although the majority in Quanta failed to specify the
best way to charge cleanup costs to the estate, it implied that these
costs could be treated as an administrative expense.14 Because the
estate pays administrative expenses before any other general obli-
gation,1 7 charging the cleanup costs as an administrative expense
143. See Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. UMET Trust, 469 F. Supp. 643, 644
(E.D. Pa. 1979); see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRupTcy, supra note 140, at 554.02; cf. In re
Motley, 10 Bankr. 141, 147 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981) (if no creditor objects to abandonment,
trustee may abandon without leave of court).
144. 739 F.2d at 925 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
145. See In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 330 F. Supp. 131, 147 (D. Conn. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 457 F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972) ("[T]he public inter-
est cannot demand the erosion of the bankrupt's assets to the point of confiscating practi-
cally the entire estate. At some point the extent and degree of taking runs into the constitu-
tional prohibition . . . [on] the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation."); see also United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 73-82 (1982)
(rights of a secured creditor in a debtor's assets are "property" subject to a taking).
146. 739 F.2d at 922-23.
147. 11 U.S.CA. § 507(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Within the Code's scheme of priori-
ties for the distribution of unencumbered assets, administrative expenses are paid first. See
Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy under the '78 Code, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 575, 658-
64 (1980). Whether unsecured creditors have a property interest in a debtor's estate that is
subject to a taking is unclear, but secured creditors do have a recognized property interest
in a debtor's estate. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 73-82 (1982).
Although administrative expenses generally are paid from unencumbered assets, the trus-
tee might tap secured assets for some administrative costs as well. Any expense that can be
characterized as one to preserve property for the creditor holding a security interest in it
can be recovered from that property. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1982). Under this authority, a court
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might deplete most of the estate's assets, leaving little or nothing
for creditors. In a footnote, the majority analogized this problem to
land use cases in which the state's exercise of its police power di-
minished but did not destroy property values. The court used
these cases to support its contention that the application of estate
assets to cleanup costs would not result in a taking. 48 This analy-
sis is persuasive if cleanup costs are charged to the estate as a gen-
eral credit obligation.149 It is less persuasive if the costs are
charged as an administrative expense which requires all cleanup
costs to be paid before general creditors can recoup anything from
the estate.
Because it provided for a hearing and for some balancing of the
equities, the abandonment provision afforded the Third Circuit in
Quanta more flexibility than the automatic stay provision afforded
the Sixth Circuit in Kovacs L1150 The abandonment provision also
provided the Third Circuit with a firmer basis upon which to favor
the State's interest over the creditors' interest in the estate in
Quanta than the court had in Penn Terra in finding an exception
to the automatic stay provision.
could order cleanup of property subject to a security interest to "preserve" it for the secured
creditor. Increasing administrative expenses by fulfilling environmental obligations to the
state before fulfilling other obligations to creditors may constitute a taking, particularly if,
as argued by New York in Quanta, compliance with state law would so deplete estate assets
that secured creditors would receive less in satisfaction of their claims than they otherwise
would have. 739 F.2d at 922 n.11.
148. 739 F.2d at 922 n.11. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Each of these cases holds that land use regulations that
reduce, but do not completely destroy, property values are exercises of the police power that
do not constitute takings.
149. For a discussion of treating government claims for cleanup obligations as secured or
priority obligations rather than as general obligations, see infra notes 249-60 and accompa-
nying text.
150. Although an interested party may request a hearing to obtain relief from an auto-
matic stay, this hearing procedure does not afford the court as much discretion as is implicit
in the hearing requirement of the abandonment provision. Compare 11 U.S.CA. § 362(d)-(e)
(West Supp. 1985) with 11 U.S.CA § 554(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1985).
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NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco
The Opinion
Under the Third Circuit's analysis in Quanta, courts apparently
may balance the rights of creditors against environmental concerns
when the two conflict. The United States Supreme Court recently
suggested in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,'5' however, that bank-
ruptcy concerns merit considerable weight in that balancing. In
Bildisco, the Court faced a conflict between the Bankruptcy Code
and federal labor laws, and the Code prevailed. The Court permit-
ted the debtor in Chapter 11 reorganization to reject its collective
bargaining agreements under Code section 365 as burdensome ex-
ecutory contracts.152
Analysis of Bildisco
If a case similar to Quanta reaches the Supreme Court, the
Bildisco decision portends a different result than the Third Circuit
reached in Quanta. Indeed, in Ohio v. Kovacs,'53 the Court re-
cently indicated the strength of bankruptcy protections by striking
the balance in favor of the Code rather than environmental stat-
utes.154 The equities involved in Ohio v. Kovacs differed, however,
from those involved in a corporate bankruptcy such as Quanta or
Bildisco. Kovacs sought relief from state efforts to use his individ-
ual future earnings to satisfy environmental obligations incurred
before bankruptcy. 155 In this personal bankruptcy situation, the
Court held that the environmental obligations were discharged
under Code section 727.156 Section 727 cannot serve as the basis for
discharge of a corporate debtor's obligations. 157
151. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
152. Id. at 1196, 1199. Code section 365 provides in part: "Except as provided [elsewhere],
the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor." 11 U.S.CA § 365 (West Supp. 1985).
153. 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985), afg sub nom. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983).
154. See id. at 711.
155. Id. at 707.
156. Id. at 708-10.
157. Code section 727 provides in part: "The court shall grant the debtor a discharge,
unless- (1) the debtor is not an individual ... " 11 U.S.CA. § 727 (West 1979 & Supp.
1985).
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Although Bildisco involved a conflict between the Code and la-
bor, not environmental, laws, it provides a useful insight into how
the Court would analyze a conflict between the Code and environ-
mental laws in the case of a corporate bankrupt. Labor laws enjoy
a favored status in the United States,158 and they have promoted
the public interest longer than toxic waste laws have served the
public. Despite the importance of federal labor laws, the Supreme
Court indicated that those laws must give way to the Bankruptcy
Code when the two conflict because a contrary result would frus-
trate the Code's policy of giving breathing room to debtors.1 9 The
Court obviously holds in high regard the policies underlying the
Code.
Particularly troubling to the environmental cause is the parallel
between the Court's application of Code section 365 and the lan-
guage of Code section 554. In Bildisco, the Court permitted rejec-
tion of executory contracts that it found burdensome under section
365, while section 554 explicitly permits the trustee to reject bur-
densome property.160 If the Court applied the Bildisco analysis to
facts similar to those in Quanta, it might permit hazardous waste
site owners to "dump" burdensome waste sites, just as unions now
complain that some airlines and other struggling companies cur-
rently use the Bankruptcy Code to "dump" their collective bar-
gaining agreements.' 6'
Because the Bildisco analysis balances competing concerns, how-
ever, application of the analysis could produce a different result in
a toxic waste site bankruptcy than in a labor contract case. The
Court allowed Bildisco to reject its collective bargaining agree-
ments only because those contracts burdened the estate and the
balance of the equities favored rejection.16 2 The Court balanced the
company's hardship in attempting to reorganize under its labor
contract obligations with the hardship on the union which loss of
its contract would entail.' 63 Perhaps weighing the burden of
158. Drebsky & Santoro, Bankruptcy and Environmental Regulation: A Response, 13
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.), Sept. 1983, at 10,265.
159. 104 S. Ct. at 1199.
160. See 11 U.S.CA. § 554(a) (West Supp. 1985); supra note 13.
161. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1984, at D1, col. 4.
162. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
163. Id. at 1197.
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cleanup costs on the bankrupt's creditors against the burden of
health risks and cleanup costs on the public would tip the scales
differently. Because Bildisco involved a reorganization rather than
a liquidation as in Quanta,6 4 the policy of giving the debtor
company a fresh start 165 also may have swayed the Court in
Bildisco to favor bankruptcy protections over labor laws. In any
event, the Court's balancing of the equities indicates that the
Bankruptcy Code is not invincible and that larger concerns might
prevail over the Code under certain circumstances.
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE STATUTES
Some Possible Shield Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
The Automatic Stay
The purposes of the automatic stay in bankruptcy proceedings
are to give immediate, though temporary,' relief to the debtor
and to prevent dissipation of the estate's assets before an orderly
distribution can be made to creditors.'6 7 Congress intended the au-
tomatic stay to limit state action to some extent,'68 particularly by
denying any preferential treatment to a government entity that
also is a creditor of the bankrupt's estate.' 9 Whether the auto-
matic stay halts environmental protection actions against a debtor
depends on two factors. First, the environmental regulations must
be characterized as exercises of the police or regulatory power.1 '
164. The trustee's abandonment power may be exercised in reorganization as well as in
the Quanta liquidation situation. Cf. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 140, at 1544.01
(old bankruptcy provision addressed abandonment in reorganization, but not in liquidation,
inferring that new Code section 554 is meant to fill this gap by applying to both).
165. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
166. The Code permits the courts to lift the automatic stay under certain circumstances.
11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)-(e) (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Essentially, the courts may lift the stay
when it is no longer necessary to the administration of the estate or when relief from the
stay is requested and one of several limited criteria is met.
167. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 271.
168. Id.
169. See United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENVrL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
20,310, 20,311 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 1982).
170. The legislative history of section 362 clearly indicates that Congress considered envi-
ronmental laws to be within the scope of the police and regulatory power. See H.R. REP. No.
595, supra note 14, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6299; S. REP.
No. 989, supra note 14, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5838.
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Second, the goal of the particular environmental action must be to
protect health and safety and not to protect the state's pecuniary
interest in the debtor's assets. 17 1
Assuming that environmental laws generally fall within the
scope of the police or regulatory power, a court must focus on the
interest that the government agency wants to protect. How does
Congress' comment that courts should construe section 362(b) nar-
rowly172 affect this inquiry? One commentator has suggested that
the determination of whether health and safety interests or pecuni-
ary interests predominate is difficult when both are present and
when section 362(b) is given a narrow construction.1 73 A close read-
ing of the legislative history, however, leaves little doubt about
how courts should construe this exception. 7 4 Congress did not
want government entities to protect their pecuniary interests by
recovering assets from a debtor's estate ahead of other creditors. A
broad interpretation of police power coupled with a narrow con-
struction of a pecuniary interest, the interpretation advanced by
the Third Circuit in Penn Terra,175 would subvert this congres-
sional intent. Courts must be alert for government attempts to
Although environmental protection generally is recognized as within the police power, situa-
tions can arise in which enforcement of a law passed under the police power is not con-
cerned primarily with public health or safety. When this occurs, as evidenced by a delay in
enforcement or by the existence of factors other than health and safety as motivations for
the enforcement, a state's action may not fall within the police power exception to the auto-
matic stay. See Note, When is a Governmental Unit's Action to Enforce its Police or Regu-
latory Power Exempt from the Automatic Stay Provision of Section 362, 9 FL&. ST. UL.
REv. 369, 370-71 (1981).
171. Aaron, supra note 40, at 6.
172. The legislative history of section 362(b) evidences Congress' intent that states not be
permitted to extract funds from the debtor's estate under the guise of the police power
when the state does not seek primarily to protect public health or safety. See supra note 78
and accompanying text.
173. Aaron, supra note 40, at 6.
174. The committee reports explain:
Since the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the bank-
ruptcy court, and since they constitute a fund out of which all creditors are
entitled to share, enforcement by a governmental unit of a money judgment
would give it preferential treatment to the detriment of all other creditors.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6299; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, at 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
at 5838. Congress' intent with regard to the scope of "money judgment" is not entirely clear.
Cf. supra note 112 and accompanying text.
175. See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273; supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
protect a primarily pecuniary interest in the debtor's assets under
the guise of the police power.1
76
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
developed a test to determine the limits of the Code's deference to
state police power. In Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy
Court, 77 the Eighth Circuit stated that "police or regulatory
power" as used in section 362(b) refers to laws "affecting health,
welfare, morals, and safety, but not regulatory laws that directly
conflict with the control of the res or property by the bankruptcy
court.' 1 8 To fall within the narrow scope of the automatic stay
exceptions, therefore, the purpose of injunctions to enforce envi-
ronmental regulations must be to halt ongoing disposal violations,
not to cure past disposal practices. 79 For example, under this test
a court could issue a cease and desist order to halt additional envi-
ronmental damage, but not an order to extract money from the
estate when the health threat had been insufficient to motivate the
state to spend its own funds for the cleanup. 80 When both a
health threat and a pecuniary interest are involved in an enforce-
ment action, courts could balance subjectively the strength of the
two interests,18' yet no court has adopted this balancing approach.
The term "money judgment" also must be interpreted properly
to apply section 362 correctly. Although section 362(b) does not
bar a state from obtaining a money judgment under the authority
of laws passed pursuant to its police power, the state cannot en-
force the judgment while the automatic stay is in force.' Because
both an injunction requiring expenditure of funds and a money
judgment deplete the assets of a bankrupt's estate, a court may
find it difficult to distinguish the two. 8 3 An incisive inquiry should
ask whether the government could accomplish the cleanup itself or
176. If the state focuses its police or regulatory power on the debtor's financial obligation
rather than on health and safety concerns, the exception to the automatic stay of Code
section 362(b)(4) does not apply. In re Sampson, 17 Bankr. 528, 530 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982).
177. 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
178. 647 F.2d at 776.
179. See United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.)
20,310, 20,311 (D.N.H. Nov. 15, 1982).
180. Id. at 20,312.
181. See Drebsky & Santoro, supra note 158, at 10,262.
182. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982); see also supra note 9.
183. Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 456.
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through contractors without seriously compromising the public
health and safety, and obtain monetary reimbursement from the
waste site owner after the cleanup. Under the traditional equity
analysis, injunctive relief generally is not available when money
damages would suffice. If the government can conduct the cleanup
and then obtain reimbursement, the court should deny injunctive
relief.18 4
The Abandonment Provision
Congress provided the courts with no discretion regarding appli-
cation of the automatic stay provision. An explicit exception must
apply to deny the debtor relief. In contrast, the trustee's power to
abandon a bankrupt's burdensome property under section 554 ar-
guably is subject to judicial discretion because the section requires
a court hearing.185
Some judges have found that judicial discretion to deny aban-
donment is inappropriate for several reasons. 86 The statutory lan-
guage of section 554, unlike the language of section 362, provides
no explicit exceptions to abandonment. In addition, analogy to
Code section 1170(a), which deals with the abandonment of rail-
road lines by railroads, provides a fairly strong argument that Con-
gress intended to permit abandonment under section 554 regard-
less of the public interests involved. To avoid erosion of a secured
creditor's interest in the debtor's property, the legislative history
of section 1170(a) indicates that the Constitution might require the
courts to allow trustees of bankrupt railroads to abandon railroad
lines even when abandonment is not in the public interest. 87
184. See Comment, supra note 6, at 10,100.
185. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Quanta, 739 F.2d at 924 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
187. See id. at 925 n.2. Specifically, the legislative history provides:
[Section 1170(a)] permits the court to authorize the abandonment of a railroad
line if the abandonment is consistent with the public interest of the estate or
essential to the formulation of a plan. This avoids the normal abandonment
requirements of generally applicable railroad regulatory law. The authority to
abandon or not to abandon lines of a railroad is, of course, subject to the fifth
amendment of the Constitution, which may in particular cases require aban-
donment in order not to erode a secured creditor's interest in the debtor's
property even though the public interest dictates otherwise.
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The bankruptcy court in In re Charles George Land Reclama-
tion Trust ss found a novel solution to the potential abandonment
problem it confronted which did not involve interpreting section
554 to allow judicial discretion to deny abandonment. To prevent
an abandonment under section 554, the court dismissed a hazard-
ous waste site debtor's request to convert its Chapter 11 reorgani-
zation into a Chapter 7 liquidation.' The court recognized that
under Chapter 11 the bankrupt would have to comply with state
environmental laws because the trustee in reorganization is re-
quired to comply with state law.190 If the bankruptcy were con-
verted to a Chapter 7 liquidation, however, the court interpreted
section 554 to permit the trustee to abandon the site, which would
hinder cleanup efforts. The court relied on the discretion it found
in section 707 of the Code and denied the debtor's request to con-
vert the proceedings from reorganization to liquidation to compen-
sate for a perceived lack of discretion to deny the abandonment
under section 554.191
Judicial contortions to circumvent a perceived lack of discretion
to block an abandonment action under section 554 are unneces-
sary. The hearing requirement in the abandonment provision indi-
cates that the bankruptcy courts retain some discretion when con-
sidering abandonment requests. Discretion to deny abandonment
of a toxic waste site also is consistent with the policy that no credi-
tor should enjoy preferential treatment over other creditors of the
same class. 192 Allowing abandonment prefers other creditors over
the government to whom the debtor owes an obligation to clean up
its site. If the debtor abandons the site, the government agency has
no recourse against the estate and thus other unsecured creditors
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 423, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
6379.
188. 30 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983).
189. Id. at 925. Section 707 permits a court to dismiss a Chapter 7 filing after notice and a
hearing, and the legislative history indicates that the statutory listing of appropriate dismis-
sal examples is illustrative, not exclusive. See 11 U.S.CA. § 707 (West Supp. 1985); H.R.
REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 380, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6336;
S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, at 94, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5880.
190. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 959(b) (West Supp. 1985).
191. 30 Bankr. at 923-24.
192. See Drebsky & Santoro, supra note 158, at 10,263-64.
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are preferred. Although the government's recovery as an unsecured
creditor would be small if most of the debtor's property were sub-
ject to secured interests, the government, like any other creditor,
deserves at least an opportunity to collect from the estate. 193 Be-
cause the bankrupt hazardous waste site owner owes an outstand-
ing environmental obligation to the government, the court need
not permit abandonment if doing so would deny the government
all opportunity to collect on the obligation.
The Power of the Court
If the automatic stay does not apply and the court denies aban-
donment, the debtor has another option. The debtor might avoid
having cleanup costs levied against his estate by appealing to the
bankruptcy court for an injunction pursuant to the court's general
powers in equity. Code section 105 gives bankruptcy courts discre-
tion to issue an injunction when the exercise of a state's power to
protect public health and safety91 contravenes bankruptcy policies
to an extent that justifies judicial intervention.195 Although govern-
ment orders that do not seek to enforce money judgments are ex-
cepted from the automatic stay, Congress provided, in section 105,
an alternate means by which debtors that truly need judicial pro-
tection may obtain a stay. In the legislative history of section 105,
both houses of Congress noted that "[b]y excepting an act or ac-
tion from the automatic stay, the bill simply requires that the trus-
tee move the court into action.. . . [T]he court will have to deter-
mine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular action which
may be harming the estate should be stayed."'9 6
Section 105 leaves open the possibility that the bankruptcy court
may shield the estate from any orders to proceed with a hazardous
193. Whether the government should be granted a status higher than unsecured creditors
is treated infra at notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
194. Such an exercise of the police power arguably would bring the state's request for
injunctive relief within the section 362(b) exception to the automatic stay. See supra note
87.
195. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273.
196. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6298; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 5837.
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waste site cleanup even when an environmental hazard is so immi-
nent and substantial that the government agency's overriding con-
cern is the public health or safety and not its own pecuniary inter-
est. 1 7 Section 105 permits this action when the court perceives
that creditors' rights are sufficiently threatened. The balance of the
equities between the hazard to the public if a stay were granted
and the harm to creditors if a stay were denied would be critical to
a court's analysis. Under the proper circumstances, the court could
leave a government unable to enforce against a bankrupt laws en-
acted pursuant to its police power even if enforcement were ex-
cepted from the automatic stay provision.
Environmental Protection Law Requirements
Both the federal and state governments have passed laws to pro-
tect the environment. Federal statutes generally provide guidelines
for both industry and state governments, and require direct federal
involvement only in cases of imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to public health or the environment. 98 State laws tend to
implement the federal guidelines and to establish standards that
the individual state legislatures deem adequate to protect the gen-
eral health and welfare of the public. 9 Although judicial attempts
to resolve conflicts between the Code and environmental laws gen-
erally have involved state statutes, these statutes may merit
197. See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 273.
198. See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.CA § 6973 (West
1983 & Supp. 1985) (imminent and substantial danger to health or the environment re-
quired before EPA Administrator can act); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1982) (imminent and substantial
danger to public health or welfare caused by an actual or threatened release of a hazardous
substance from a waste facility required before the President or Attorney General can act);
Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300i(a) (1982) (imminent and substantial dan-
ger to public health required before the EPA Administrator can act to stop contamination
of public water supplies); Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a)
(1982) (immiment and substantial danger to public health or livelihood required before the
EPA Administrator can act to stop discharge of pollutants).
199. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0900 to -0923 (McKinney 1984) (imple-
menting federal guidelines in a state program to control hazardous waste disposal); VA.
CODE § 10-186.6(A)(2)(b) (Supp. 1984) (recognizing that the Virginia board overseeing haz-
ardous waste facilities must be guided by federal regulations); see also 42 U.S.CA. §§ 6941-
6947 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985) (requiring development and federal approval of state or
regional solid waste disposal plans).
[Vol. 27:165
1985] BANKRUPTCY AND HAZARDOUS WASTE CLEANUP 199
greater deference in the courts' preemption analyses than other
state laws which arguably conflict with federal law because state
environmental laws are enacted to further federal goals.
Federal Environmental Protection Laws
Congress drafted broad federal environmental laws to grant cer-
tain government officials the power to seek judicial relief and to
take other action necessary to avert serious threats to public health
or the environment. 200 In provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 6973,
which is part of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,201
Congress gave the courts authority to grant affirmative equitable
relief when necessary to eliminate a present threat to public health
posed by toxic wastes.20 2 Congress intended to give the federal gov-
ernment the tools necessary to bring about critically needed clean-
ups, and Congress expected those who caused the toxic waste
problems to bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the
harm.203 Courts therefore should not frustrate Congress' intent by
reading environmental statutes narrowly, thereby hampering the
government's ability to respond promptly and effectively to envi-
ronmental hazards.20 4 Nor should courts limit the liability of the
responsible parties beyond the statutory limits set by Congress.20 5
When a release of hazardous waste from a facility is imminent,
Congress has empowered the federal district courts to grant "such
relief as the public interest and the equities of the case require"206
to enforce environmental laws. Bankruptcy courts could use this
power to enforce environmental laws against bankrupt waste site
owners when the sites pose an imminent and substantial threat to
200. United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1070 (D.N.J. 1981), ai'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d
Cir. 1982).
201. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.CA §§ 6901-6987
(West 1983 & Supp. 1985)).
202. 688 F.2d at 214.
203. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn.
1982).
204. Id.
205. Id. For a list of these limits, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c) (1982).
206. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
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public health."0 7 Under these conditions, bankruptcy courts must
examine the desirability of enforcing federal environmental laws
against the responsible parties, and must determine the extent to
which a debtor deserves protection under bankruptcy law. Al-
though Congress failed to provide specific guidance in any of the
environmental statutes on how courts should weigh the equities, it
did provide the courts with a basis for looking beyond the rigid
confines of the Bankruptcy Code to the equities of the situation.
Critics of the bankruptcy courts claim the courts have not taken
full advantage of this congressional invitation to examine the equi-
ties when the Code and environmental laws conflict.0 8
The existence or nonexistence of exceptions to Bankruptcy Code
provisions has figured prominently in judicial analyses of whether
the Code will preclude enforcement of certain environmental or-
ders. The existence or nonexistence of exceptions to environmental
laws should play an equally significant role when these laws con-
flict with the Code. For example, the environmental cleanup provi-
sion contained in 42 U.S.C. § 6973 authorizes federal authorities to
obtain a court order compelling the owner to clean up his site
when cleanup is necessary to abate a present threat to public
health. 09 The statute does not exempt a hazardous waste site
owner who has filed for bankruptcy. The lack of an express excep-
tion may suggest that Congress simply failed to consider this possi-
bility, but it also may indicate the strength of the congressional
resolve to clean up dump sites that pose a health threat to the
public.
207. Enforcement of environmental regulations by federal authorities when serious
threats to public health arise from a bankrupt's waste sites would comport with the excep-
tion from the automatic stay permitting state enforcement of environmental laws. For ex-
ample, when states act pursuant to proper exercise of the police power, and not in the fur-
therance of a pecuniary interest, an exception to the stay applies. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-
(5) (1982).
208. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 4, at 1 (quoting E. Dennis Muchnicki, Ohio Asst. Att'y
Gen.) ("The courts have shown greater concern for the pecuniary interests of financial insti-
tutions and the debtors who have acted in violation of state law than for the health and
safety of the public."); see also id. at 1, 9 (quoting the Justice Department amicus brief filed
with the Supreme Court on the appeal of the Kovacs I decision) ("Automatic application of
the stay to enforcement of [environmental] orders . . . elevates the Bankruptcy Code over
the federal and state health and safety laws, thus permitting and encouraging bankruptcy as
an escape from the costs of environmental protection.")
209. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1107.
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State Environmental Protection Laws
Clashes between environmental protection laws and the Code
that have reached the courts to date generally have involved state
rather than federal environmental laws. Perhaps the courts would
weigh Congress' resolve to clean up the environment more heavily
if federal law were directly at issue. Because potential toxic waste
problems usually are handled first under state laws, however, con-
flicts with the Code more often involve only state law.
The cleanup provisions of federal statutes such as the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act do not treat chronic and recurring
problems that are better handled by state statutes.210 The states,
therefore, supply much of the legislation necessary to implement
comprehensive environmental cleanup.2 n Compliance with this
legislation may be sufficiently burdensome to force some waste site
owners to consider bankruptcy as an alternative to compliance.
At least one court has stated that courts should hesitate to de-
clare that the Code has preempted a state environmental statute
when the state has enacted its statute pursuant to federal goals.212
This analysis is atypical. The courts generally consider the police
or regulatory power the sole basis of state environmental statutes,
and the courts usually give only incidental mention to the broader
federal environmental programs.213 Although consideration of the
federal backdrop might not alter judicial analysis in all state envi-
ronmental law conflicts with the Code, perhaps the courts would
balance the equities differently and uphold the environmental laws
over the Code more often in close cases.
Whether a particular state environmental law violation consti-
tutes a criminal offense as well as a basis for civil action also might
influence the analysis of a given case. Judicial recognition of the
state's concern in criminal matters might tip the scales of equity
210. Id. at 1110.
211. See supra note 63. In addition to state statutes, some cleanup efforts have been pur-
sued using common law theories such as nuisance and strict liability. See supra note 65.
212. See In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333, 1336 (D.P.R. 1979) (Puerto
Rico statute enforcing compliance with federal clean air requirements upheld over bank-
ruptcy stay).
213. See, e.g., Kovacs I, 681 F.2d at 456; United States v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 13
ENvmL. L. RFP. (ENvmL. L. INsT.) 20,310, 20,312 (D.N.H. 1982) (federal statutes mentioned in
passing only; case decided entirely on the basis of a state law conflict with the Code).
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against protection of the bankrupt.214 State criminal sanctions do
not conflict directly with the Code, unlike remedial civil sanctions
having a substantial pecuniary impact. State officials, therefore,
might persuade a court not to construe a Code conflict that would
require federal preemption.21 5 Furthermore, despite the great pub-
lic interest in protecting creditors, 16 the criminal culpability of a
waste site operator might influence a court to view the state envi-
ronmental enforcement action not as an attempt to enforce a
money judgment, but as an action in which monetary damages
would afford inadequate relief, and thus not the type of action
properly subject to bankruptcy stays.21
SUMMARIZING THE POLICIES
Policies Favoring Protection of the Bankrupt Hazardous Waste
Site Owner
The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution 21 8 pro-
vides the strongest argument for bankruptcy protection of hazard-
ous waste site owners when the Code would shield the bankrupt
from state environmental protection laws.21 9 The principle that
federal law prevails over inconsistent state law is a fundamental
feature of our constitutional system.220 Problems arise in applying
this principle to specific cases, however, because courts have diffi-
culty determining when federal and state laws are inconsistent. 2 1
The desire to provide creditors with the greatest possible protec-
tion in cases of debtor insolvency supplies a second policy argu-
ment favoring bankruptcy protection. This policy offers several
214. See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 921.
215. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
216. See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 921.
217. Aaron, supra note 40, at 19-20. Subsection (b)(1) of the automatic stay provision
specifically exempts criminal proceedings against the debtor from application of the stay. 11
U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982).
218. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
219. The concept of preemption is not a policy, strictly speaking, but because it is so
central to the functioning of our federal system, it is treated here as a policy given constitu-
tional sanction.
220. Quanta, 739 F.2d at 917.
221. Cf. id. at 923 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (pointing out that environmental protection
laws do not address the same interests as the bankruptcy laws).
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benefits. First, it protects creditors who might lose a "race to judg-
ment" if they are not protected from unfair treatment in the set-
tlement of the debtor's estate.222 Second, the policy promotes com-
mercial needs by assuring creditors that, even in insolvency, they
will not be left completely in the cold. This assurance encourages
creditors to extend the capital essential to the needs of the market-
place. Finally, creditor protections return capital from bankrupt,
nonproductive entities to the successful, ongoing businesses of
creditors, a monetary flow that promotes market efficiency.
A third policy argument favoring bankruptcy protection of credi-
tors is prevention of the takings from creditors that could result if
courts strictly enforced environmental protection laws against
debtors.22 s Given the expense of cleanup operations,224 strict en-
forcement of environmental laws easily could exhaust the equity
interest of an estate, leaving nothing for liquidation.2 25 A cleanup
injunction that consumes a bankrupt's estate may violate the fifth
amendment prohibition against taking private property for public
use without just compensation.2
Finally, two doctrines of judicial construction also favor bank-
ruptcy protection of hazardous waste site owners. First, courts
avoid reaching constitutional questions in statutory interpretation
cases when another ground for decision is possible. 227 Courts would
follow this doctrine and avoid any fifth amendment question by
strictly applying Bankruptcy Code provisions to deny government
enforcement of cleanup obligations against a debtor's estate. Sec-
ond, full protection under the Bankruptcy Code avoids granting
equitable relief when money damages would suffice. Only in rare
222. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (MB) 362.04 (15th ed. 1985).
223. Avoiding a taking of private property for public use actually goes beyond the import
of mere policy because of the constitutional sanction given to it by the fifth amendment. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
224. See supra note 1.
225. See Quanta, 739 F.2d at 923; cf. id. (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("How can the trustee
reach into the creditors' pockets for the cost of the cleanup, and if he can, which creditor's
pocket?").
226. At least some creditors do have a "property" interest in a debtor's assets which could
be subject to a taking. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 73-82 (1982);
see also In re New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 330 F. Supp. 131, 147 (D. Conn. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 457 F.2d 683 (2d Cir. 1972) (public interest cannot demand erosion of the
bankrupt's assets to the point of confiscating the entire estate).
227. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 78.
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circumstances would money damages not accomplish the same en-
vironmental protection sought by a government cleanup order. The
Code does not permit equity to intervene and favor the govern-
ment or the public over other creditors when a cleanup order
would protect primarily a pecuniary interest.22
Policies Favoring Imposition of Environmental Duties Upon a
Bankrupt Hazardous Waste Site Operator
Weighed against the policies favoring bankruptcy protection of
hazardous waste site owners are some strong policies favoring envi-
ronmental cleanup by the offender. First, the accepted Code inter-
pretation disfavors preemption of a state law by the bankruptcy
laws when the conflict is not direct.22 This interpretation upholds
the tenth amendment to the United States Constitution, which
reserves to the states the police power, thus preserving the states'
right and duty to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. 30
Because states enact environmental laws pursuant to this power,
and Congress enacts bankruptcy laws pursuant to federal powers
that serve entirely different interests, these laws do not conflict di-
rectly. Viewing these two statutory schemes as a whole, the lack of
direct conflict implies that the Code does not preempt state envi-
ronmental statutes.231 The existence of federal statutes requiring
environmental cleanup also weakens the supremacy clause argu-
ment for bankruptcy protection. These laws, enacted pursuant to
Congress' interstate commerce power,23 2 provide guidelines for im-
plementing state statutes and stand on equal footing with federal
228. See supra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
229. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 272-73; see also In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d
1, 5 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942) (when the police power is deemed with-
drawn, evidence of that withdrawal should be found within the act).
230. See U.S. CONsT. amend. X, see also Brown v. Brannon, 399 F. Supp. 133, 147
(M.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd, 535 F.2d 1249 (4th Cir. 1976) (exercise of the police power is re-
served to the states by the tenth amendment).
231. Cf. Florida Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (when
statutory schemes as a whole do not conflict, a conflict is not to be construed between par-
ticular provisions because preemption is disfavored unless that conclusion is unmistakable).
Given the controversy in the courts and among legal scholars concerning whether the Bank-
ruptcy Code conflicts with environmental laws, the conflict in this instance hardly appears
unmistakable.
232. See Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. at 1107-08.
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laws enacted under the bankruptcy power. State laws enacted pur-
suant to federal guidelines perhaps should be accorded some of the
force and effect of federal law.
A total failure to enforce environmental duties against bank-
ruptcy estates also would contravene the bankruptcy policy of pro-
tecting all creditors.23 3 "Creditor," as defined by the Code, encom-
passes any "entity that has a claim against the debtor. ' 23 4 "Claim"
connotes any "right to payment. . . or right to an equitable rem-
edy. '235 Because environmental statutes typically provide for in-
junctive enforcement or damages for failure to comply, a state gov-
ernment attempting to enforce environmental laws against a
debtor's estate would have a "claim," qualifying it as a "creditor"
under the Code.236 Complete relief to the debtor from all environ-
mental obligations through Code protection would unfairly favor
other creditors over the state government creditor.
Potential tort claimants-persons who might suffer adverse ef-
fects from a nearby toxic waste dump-also are creditors of a
bankrupt site owner. 37 These persons could suffer injury if a court
does not permit the state to enforce its environmental laws against
the bankrupt. Although a judicial decision precluding environmen-
tal law enforcement would protect the bankrupt's traditional credi-
tors, the interests of the government and potential tort claimants
as "creditors" would not be protected.238 Filing for bankruptcy to
escape obligations to state environmental agencies or potential tort
233. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
234. 11 U.S.C. § 101(9)(A) (1982).
235. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982).
236. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 709-10 (holding that state environmental cleanup
obligations are a debt of the estate); see also Kovacs I, 717 F.2d at 988 (holding that envi-
ronmental laws provided the State with a "claim" against the offender which could be char-
acterized as a "debt").
237. The definition of a claim includes "unmatured" as well as matured rights of action
against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). The definition of "claim," and therefore the
definition of "creditor," was intended to be as broad as possible. These definitions contem-
plate all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent. See HR REP.
No. 595, supra note 14, at 309, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6266; S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 14, at 21, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5807-
08.
238. Permitting state agencies to enforce cleanup obligations may do little to protect tort
victims suffering from ills already inflicted by toxic wastes or to protect victims carrying
latent, unmanifested injuries. Timely enforcement of cleanup obligations would reduce the
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claimants also might constitute a type of fraud upon these credi-
tors. Efforts to avoid these obligations in bankruptcy could amount
to favoritism for some creditors over others, which is inconsistent
with the asset distribution scheme of the Code. As a court of eq-
uity, a bankruptcy court should not permit improper favoritism.
Because states enact environmental laws pursuant to their police
power, a taking from creditors through enforcement of these laws
can be avoided as long as enforcement promotes the public good
and merely reduces, but does not destroy, the value of creditors'
interests. 239 Relying on the principle that the public good demands
toxic waste cleanup, the state may erode creditors' interests
through enforcement of cleanup obligations against the debtor
without violating any fifth amendment prohibitions.
Finally, equity provides good policy justifications for enforce-
ment of environmental laws against a debtor's estate. Clear na-
tional goals favor the protection of the environment and public
health and safety, and public policy strongly favors prosecution for
violations of regulations issued pursuant to this goal. 40 Courts
should not permit a bankruptcy trustee to violate state law with
impunity.24 Courts of equity should grant equitable relief to pre-
vent this wrong, relief that should include affirmative injunctions
when necessary to force hazardous waste site owners to comply
with the law.
length of the exposure, however, and could reduce the number of victims eventually af-
fected. State enforcement of cleanup obligations, therefore, asserts to some extent the inter-
ests of potential tort claimants as well.
A further conflict arises in the tort claim situation, which requires consideration before a
governmental entity is permitted to enforce environmental laws against a bankrupt. Despite
the risk that misuse of bankruptcy law might permit a site owner to escape tort liability, a
failure to permit some protection in bankruptcy could cripple a site owner, depleting his
assets through the early settlement of tort claims and the fulfillment of cleanup obligations,
leaving later victims with empty claims against a bare corporate charter. See Roe, Bank-
ruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 847-48 (1984).
239. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980); Penn Central Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
592-93 (1962).
240. In re Canarico Quarries, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (D.P.R. 1979).
241. See id. (rehabilitation of a debtor must be done within the law); see also Quanta,
739 F.2d at 919 (Congress did not intend trustees to be able to contravene state law).
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EXAMINING SOME OPTIONS
The courts face a difficult task in reconciling statutory directives
to protect the environment and to protect the bankrupt and his
creditors.242 Ultimately, the courts must determine who should
bear the costs of hazardous waste cleanup. They must choose be-
tween the bankrupt's creditors, through the debtor's estate, and
the taxpayer, through state and federal agencies. A fair resolution
may be a compromise between these two extremes.
At least one commentator has suggested that courts and legisla-
tures should not strive to resolve the conflict because the problem
eventually will disappear.2 43  This commentator's rationale
presumes that bankruptcy is a severe remedy, one providing no
painless refuge.244 Admittedly, new environmental laws will force
many small operators into bankruptcy, which will force the courts
to struggle with conflicting policies for a few years. Larger corpora-
tions desiring to stay in business will cooperate with the various
government trusts such as "Superfund, '245 however, to eventually
eliminate the toxic waste problem and associated court disputes.
The "do nothing" theory probably has considerable long-term
merit. In the short term, however, the many barely solvent "mom
and pop" hazardous waste operations 246 might clog the bankruptcy
courts, compelling a more systematic approach to the problem
than simply "waiting for it to go away."
One option is to totally favor the debtor and his creditors over
government environmental agencies, but this option probably
presents insurmountable difficulties. If a waste site operator could
terminate his environmental duties simply by filing for reorganiza-
tion, the Bankruptcy Code would afford the operator an automatic
refuge whenever cleanup duties became otherwise unavoidable.
This practice not only would undermine the sound policies under-
lying environmental laws, but also would frustrate the Code policy
242. Comment, supra note 6, at 10,099.
243. Moore, supra note 4, at 9 (quoting Mark Wine, attorney for Kirkland & Ellis, Chi-
cago, Ill.).
244. Id.
245. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 42, & 49
U.S.C.).
246. Moore, supra note 4, at 9.
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of fair and equal treatment for all creditors to whom the debtor
owes similar obligations. Given the current national concern about
toxic waste dumps, this option finds little support in the case law,
and Congress certainly would eliminate it if the option ever found
favor in the courts. The option at the other extreme also merits
little serious consideration. Some would advocate vigorous enforce-
ment of every environmental statute against bankrupt offenders,
but the courts are unlikely to permit the obscure or marginally sig-
nificant state environmental requirements to displace an entire ti-
tle of the United States Code.
Where between these extremes are the courts to strike the
proper balance? To develop alternative solutions to the dilemma
requires consideration of the many potential conflicts between the
operative Code provisions and the competing regulatory inter-
ests.24 7 A government agency may assert purely an environmental
interest; it may assert purely a pecuniary interest; most frequently,
it asserts both.248 A workable solution to the conflict must provide
the courts with the flexibility to do justice in any factual setting.
Alternatives Under Existing Law
The Bankruptcy Code classifies a government agency seeking en-
vironmental cleanup through a claim against a bankruptcy estate
as a general unsecured creditor. 249 As an unsecured creditor, the
government can recoup its cleanup costs only after satisfaction of
the secured and priority claims.250 Making the state a general un-
secured creditor effectively serves the policies of the Bankruptcy
Code. The supremacy of federal law over state environmental laws
is preserved, senior creditors are protected, and unconstitutional
takings are prevented. On the other hand, this status restricts the
247. See Aaron, supra note 40, at 2.
248. Cf. id. at 26 ("distinction between those environmental restraints which serve only a
pecuniary objective and those which serve an important environmental value is most
unclear").
249. See 11 U.S.C.A_ §§ 506-507 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), (9)
(1982).
250. See generally Rendleman, supra note 147, at 654-72 (explaining the asset distribu-
tion scheme of the Code with regard to secured, priority, and general creditors).
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power of state agencies to enforce cleanup laws against environ-
mental offenders. Although state laws requiring cleanup are not su-
perseded totally, the state can recover only a percentage of its
claim. After the payment of priority claims, including administra-
tive expenses, 251 the state will recover from the remaining assets a
portion of its claim based on the ratio of cleanup costs to total
debts. The Code protects the waste site operator from liability be-
yond the value of unsecured assets.
Enforcement of cleanup injunctions against a bankrupt through
an exception to the automatic stay improves the state's status as a
creditor because the state can compel performance of regulatory
obligations before any distributions to other creditors. Conversely,
a trustee's successful abandonment of a waste site subordinates the
state's claim to the claims of other unsecured creditors because it
completely severs the claim from the estate. How are courts to deal
with these attempts to adjust claimant priorities? Is adjustment of
claimant status the most appropriate way to treat policy conflicts
between the Code and environmental laws?
Courts can achieve both flexibility and fairness only by examin-
ing the particular government interests asserted and by tailoring
relief according to these interests. Specifically, courts must deter-
mine whether the government claim against the debtor primarily
seeks to protect a pecuniary interest or a health and safety inter-
est. This determination is consistent with the analysis Congress in-
tended the courts to apply to the automatic stay and its excep-
tions.252 A state's pecuniary interest in a debtor's estate deserves
no more protection than other monetary claims under the Code,
but interests clearly related to protection of health and safety
merit an exception to the Code's rigidity.
In determining which is the state's primary asserted interest,
courts should consider such factors as:
1. the state's ability to perform the cleanup itself and then
seek reimbursement;
2. the magnitude and imminence of the health threat;
3. the length of time since the hazard was created;
251. See 11 U.S.CA § 507 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
252. See supra notes 171-84 and accompanying text.
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4. any government laxity in failing to pursue cleanup before
bankruptcy proceedings were initiated; and
5. the degree to which the cleanup would deplete the assets
of the estate.
This analysis should provide a sufficient basis for determining
whether the automatic stay or any other temporary stay should ap-
ply. If the state lacks capacity to perform the cleanup, the health
threat is severe or imminent, the state has had little opportunity to
correct the problem because of its recent inception, or the cleanup
costs are minimal, then a stay of cleanup efforts might be inappro-
priate. A stay of the state's cleanup efforts would be more appro-
priate if the state could perform the cleanup itself or obtain a liq-
uidated estimate of the cleanup cost for a monetary claim. A stay
also would be more appropriate if the cleanup would deplete the
estate assets seriously, the site does not present a severe health
threat, or the hazard is one of long standing and previously was
ignored by the state. This analysis achieves fairness to the bank-
rupt, the creditors, the state, and the public. It also maintains the
flexibility necessary to reach the proper result in a specific factual
situation.
Proposals for Change
A Change in the State's Status as a Creditor
The courts might achieve a better accommodation between the
conflicting policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code and environ-
mental protection laws if they applied a different status to a gov-
ernment agency trying to collect from a bankrupt estate. The Code
now limits the flexibility of a court to dictate a status other than
general unsecured creditor. The Code permits some maneuvering
when a cleanup injunction is sought by allowing the courts to char-
acterize the asserted right as one involving enforcement under the
police power rather than the assertion of a pecuniary interest. This
flexibility creates problems if courts resort to this characterization
too freely because it erodes other creditors' interests and impli-
cates possible fifth amendment "taking" concerns.
The Code provides for secured and priority statuses in its cur-
rent distribution scheme, but courts presently have only covert
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means 253 of assigning either of these statuses to state enforcement
agencies. Congress, however, could legislate a status change. State
agencies could attain secured status in the enforcement of environ-
mental laws through a statutory lien.254 State legislatures could im-
pose such a lien, but the lien would be more effective if it were
federally enacted and explicitly recognized in the Code. The Code
currently permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid most state-
imposed statutory liens unless the lienholder meets strict timing
and filing requirements. 55 Even if a state legislature allowed an
environmental agency to gain secured status and the agency met
the timing and filing requirements, the agency nevertheless might
be restricted to a recovery from unsecured assets because any other
secured creditor's previously perfected security interest would give
that creditor priority with respect to the secured property.256
Another status option is available. A court could assign an
agency priority status by classifying cleanup costs as an adminis-
trative expense. For example, New York State sought to change
cleanup costs as a priority expense in In re Quanta Resources
Corp.257 Because classifying cleanup costs as an administrative ex-
pense could consume nearly the entire value of the estate, however,
253. Allowing states to enforce cleanup orders under the guise of the police power when a
pecuniary interest actually is being asserted would have an effect similar to the granting of a
security interest to the state. The state would be able to enforce cleanup obligations before
other creditors would be paid. See Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 271-77; see also supra notes 101-
22 and accompanying text. Allowing enforcement of cleanup obligations as administrative
expenses would provide a way to adjust the priority of the state as a creditor. Cf. Quanta,
739 F.2d at 922-23 (remanding the case for a determination of whether cleanup expenses
could be charged as an administrative expense).
254. A statutory lien is an encumberance on property similar to a security interest, "aris-
ing solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions." 11 U.S.CA
§ 101(45) (West Supp. 1985).
255. See 11 U.S.CA. § 545 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
256. Secured creditors perfect their security interests by taking all steps legally required
to give them an interest in a debtor's property good against other creditors. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1023 (5th ed. 1979). This process usually involves certain filings to meet notice
requirements. If the security interest is perfected after another security interest in the same
property, the earlier interest will take from the property first, with residual value available
to the later perfected interest holder. See U.C.C. §§ 9-302 to -306 (1977).
A state could attempt to displace a creditor with an earlier perfected security interest in
the same property by establishing a statutory lien providing for preference over the other
lien holder. This action, however, undoubtedly would create fifth amendment taking
problems. See Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 73-82.
257. 739 F.2d at 922.
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a court adopting this approach in a Quanta situation probably
would be stretching the definition of "administrative expenses. ''11 s
Congress, of course, could confer priority status upon state envi-
ronmental agencies explicitly, or it could indicate specifically that
cleanup costs are an administrative expense under the Code. 59
The secured and priority statuses, as presently defined in the
Code, present significant problems if applied in the context of a
hazardous waste site bankruptcy. To avoid a "taking" from other
creditors, both depend upon the availability of sufficient unsecured
assets to meet cleanup costs. If administrative costs exceed the
value of unsecured property, administration usually should end,
leaving the secured creditors to foreclose on the secured property.
When the waste site itself is subject to a security interest, the se-
cured creditor will not foreclose on a site requiring more in cleanup
expenditures than its market value. In this situation, a further di-
lemma arises. The debtor will retain title to the property, 2 0 and
the state will have no further recourse against the debtor after the
unsecured assets are depleted. Secured status, if not perfected
before other liens, also will permit recovery only from unsecured
assets. Any attempt to recover on the assets ahead of more senior
secured creditors would result in a serious "takings" problem. Se-
cured and priority statuses also would erode the status of all junior
creditors. These statuses would place the government ahead of tort
claimants and other general creditors, possibly leaving them with
no recovery against the estate.
Creation of a New Creditor Status for State Environmental
Regulatory Agencies
Instead of adjusting the status of government claimants to fur-
ther environmental policies within the existing Code scheme, other
options exist which might accomplish the desired results more ef-
fectively, and without as many adverse side effects. One option
258. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
259. Representative Florio twice has introduced legislation to give state agencies attempt-
ing to impose cleanup duties a priority claim against hazardous waste site owners in bank-
ruptcy. See H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 7172, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
260. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 14, at 377, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6333; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 14, at 92, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS at 5878.
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would be to confer a hybrid status upon state enforcement agen-
cies. Under this hybrid status, environmental agencies would col-
lect on a pro rata basis with all creditors whether secured, priority,
or unsecured. For example, if a bankrupt had assets equal to its
outstanding liabilities and it also owed cleanup obligations to the
state equalling all estate assets, the bankruptcy court would divide
the estate equally between the creditors and the state. Every credi-
tor, regardless of status, would recover half of whatever he other-
wise would have received.
If state environmental agencies collected from the estate in this
way, all creditors would receive some recovery from the estate
without being completely displaced by cleanup costs. Tort claim-
ants would receive a pro rata share from the unsecured assets, and
secured creditors would receive a pro rata share from the secured
property. This status change might avoid an unconstitutional tak-
ing because no creditor would be deprived completely of his inter-
est in the assets and because the law recognizes that property may
be reduced in value through proper exercise of the police power
when the public interest so requires.' Placing secured creditors
on notice that they may be forced to share in cleanup costs also
may encourage creditors to police waste site operators in the per-
formance of their cleanup duties and cause waste site owners to
operate in a more fiscally and environmentally responsible manner.
Other Options
Another option for better enforcing cleanup duties would be to
use criminal sanctions against violators of hazardous waste laws.
Although some state statutes already provide for criminal sanc-
tions under certain circumstances, 62 additional criminal penalties
vigorously enforced prior to direct enforcement of cleanup laws
could discourage bankruptcy filings. The added incentive of crimi-
nal sanctions likely would compel compliance with environmental
laws if at all possible, because the Code does not shelter debtors
261. See supra note 148.
262. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25191 (West 1984). Virginia provides for
enforcement through civil penalties instead of criminal sanctions, but the deterrent effect
may be nearly as great due to the severity of the penalty, which could be as much as $10,000
per day of violation. VA. CODE § 10-186.19(C) (Supp. 1984).
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from criminal sanction. 63 The Code also does not bar recovery of
fines imposed upon a debtor for noncompliance with environmen-
tal laws.2" The Supreme Court suggested in Ohio v. Kovacs that
states should seek recoupment of such fines, rather than damages,
to avoid Code preclusion of states' claims.265
An additional option for achieving cleanup despite bankruptcy
would be to shift financial responsibility from any nominal corpo-
ration directly to the individuals operating the site. If a court
found that the individuals breached their fiduciary duties by fail-
ing to perform the corporation's legal obligations, and that this
failure led to. the bankruptcy, the court could hold all owners, or
directors and officers, personally liable. The threat of shiftable per-
sonal liability266 could force corporate officials to exercise extreme
caution to avoid bankruptcy, or to obtain insurance covering any
personal liability in the event of bankruptcy. This insurance could
provide some of the necessary cleanup funds.
Other possible means of achieving waste cleanup without adjust-
ing the Code status of state environmental agency creditors include
a requirement to maintain financial responsibility insurance cover-
age, mandatory contributions to state and federal cleanup trusts
such as "Superfund," and the imposition of financial responsibility
standards for onshore waste sites similar to the standards for off-
shore waste carriers imposed by the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.267 Any of these mea-
sures would carry the 'risk of actually causing waste site operators
to declare bankruptcy because of added fiscal obligations, but this
short-term risk certainly would minimize the problems of future
waste site bankruptcies.
263. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1) (1982) (exception from the automatic stay provided for all
criminal proceedings against the debtor).
264. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (1982).
265. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 711.
266. Cf. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE LJ. 857, 868-76 (1984) (outlining the effects of shifting personal liability to managers
and positing the development of insurance coverage to bridge the liability gap).
267. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26,
42, & 49 U.S.C.). One provision of this Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9608(b), already provides that the
federal government will impose financial responsibility requirements no earlier than Decem-
ber 11, 1985. Given the EPA's tardiness in promulgating other standards, states might con-
sider imposing interim financial responsibility requirements.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
General creditor status for state enforcement agencies probably
presents a reasonable mix of flexibility and fairness to promote jus-
tice in the wide variety of possible bankruptcy situations. Too
many problems arise with any attempt to elevate the state to a
priority or secured claimant. The police power of the state should
allow assertion of a higher priority268 when a situation actually
threatens the public health and safety. Fairness to other creditors,
however, requires that this power be exercised only when the
threat is imminent and substantial, and when the remedy is not so
costly that it could consume all the assets of the estate. Large ex-
penditures by the estate to comply with cleanup injunctions should
be forced only when the state itself could not protect the public,
and even then only after due consideration of the overall impact on
other creditors. To promote greater environmental responsibility,
however, the treatment of state enforcement agencies as general
creditors should be coupled with the imposition of personal liabil-
ity on those who knowingly violate environmental laws through
both criminal and civil sanctions.
Congressional restructuring of the bankruptcy creditor statuses
to address specifically the unique problem of hazardous waste also
would do much to alleviate the dilemma currently facing the
courts. Rather than force the courts to choose between relegating
the state to collection against the estate as a general creditor and
expansively interpreting an injunction pursuant to the police
power, enforceable against the estate before other creditors collect,
a better solution would be to permit pro rata distribution from all
estate assets to the government agency to accomplish any neces-
sary cleanup. This solution would apportion costs between the es-
tate and the taxpayers and would force all creditors to take an ac-
tive interest in the debtor's fulfillment of his cleanup duties.
268. Because a state action is not barred by the automatic stay provision if the action is
based upon the state's police power and if it truly protects the public health and safety,
state environmental enforcement actions meeting these requirements can assume a higher
priority than general creditors usually enjoy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5) (1982).
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CONCLUSION
Courts face a direct conflict of policies in any clash between the
Bankruptcy Code and environmental statutes. Under present law,
the courts can treat a state agency with a typical environmental
cleanup claim against a debtor as only a general creditor. Courts
should not interpret the "police power" expansively to permit the
state to "collect" from the debtor ahead of other creditors through
enforcement of mandatory injunctions unless the action is essential
to prevent an immediate hazard to the public health or safety.
States should seek compliance with environmental statutes that do
not address a critical health threat, and therefore are not enforcea-
ble against a bankrupt, through direct sanctions against the indi-
viduals responsible for the environmental violations. Ultimately,
Congress may be compelled to act. Perhaps a solution fair to all
parties would be congressional adoption of a special status for state
environmental agencies under the Bankruptcy Code. By making
the state agencies hybrid or "pro rata" creditors, cleanup costs can
be apportioned fairly between the innocent parties involved in a
hazardous waste site bankruptcy-the taxpaying public and the
bankrupt's creditors.
DOUGLAS P. DEMoss
[Vol. 27:165
